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lntroduction 
Studies in the areas of Intemational Relations and Defense have as 
one of its primary objectives the measurement of world power, identifying 
and classifying hierarchically the Great and Medium Powers. However, the 
criteria for this are very questionable, since they are based predominantly on 
quantitative elements arranged according to previously established theories, 
often (a)historical. 
They generally take into account the country's geographical area, its 
natural wealth (agricultura! and mineral), the weight ofits economy (in gener-
al the Gross Domestic Product and per capita) and the size and structure of its 
population. Also considered are the geopolitical position, membership in rel-
evant Intemational Organizations (G-7, OECD, OTAN, UNSC), political-in-
stitutional stability and, last but not least, the size and quality of the Armed 
Forces. U sually, these items are quantified and tabulated, producing a ranldng 
of the powers and, based on these references, a series of strategic reflections 
and geopolitical scenarios are presented (Merle 1981, 119 ; Morgenthau 2003, 
215 ; Kennedy 1989, 417; Carr 1981, 99). 
U ndoubtedly, these are significant components, but the way in which 
they are articulated and their relative importance are related to other quali-
tative elements. First, there is the historical evolution (each Nation-State has 
its spedfic characteristics), the levei of social and economic development, the 
degree of articulation of the elites in power, the existence of a national project, 
the international connections and the positioning in the world system, among 
others (Halliday 2007; Wallerstein 2004, 21; Arrighi 1996, 59; Brucan 1974, 
140 ). 
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A country may possess significant military power and a large econo-
my, but it can find itself in decline due to a change in the world economy and 
the emergence of challenging power poles. Moreover, although in possession 
of a strong economy and quantitative military capabilities, sometimes they 
have sovereignty limitations, which make difficult to convert these elements 
into an effective instrument of action. Thus, the systematization of the mate-
rial elements of power can generate an erroneous statistical conception and a 
misleading strategic appraisal. 
In modem and contemporary times, with the emergence and affir-
mation of the world system, the Absolutist Dynastic States, the players of the 
Ancien Rigi.me, were formed in Europe. Then the French Revolution intro-
duced the ideological element (radical change vs. conservatism) and national 
element in Intemational Relations. The Congress of Vienna (1815), in turn, 
introduced the notion of Balance of Power between the Great Powers (Great 
Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) (Kissing-
er 1973). At the same time, nationalism and the Nation State emerged. Later 
on, as result of the First and Second World Wars, the European powers start-
ed to be dassified as middle powt:rS (especially when they lost their colonial 
empires), while the United States and Russia (transformed into the Soviet 
Union) became superpowers. Some States from the Geopolitical South (the 
Third World) were also included in the list of middle powers (ar regiona~. But 
the explanatory paradigms and intemational reality became fluids with the 
end of the Cold War. 
Therefore, a process that was already complicated in an era of a recog-
nized leadership and hegemony, had become even more complex and uncer-
tain in a phase of transition. In this sense, the aim o f this artide is to contrib-
ute to an understanding of the State' s power position in the framework of the 
post-Cold War Intemational System, particularly in the 21st century. lt is an 
exploratory vision, aiming to take into account current actions and possible 
trends for the immediate future, in the context of the economic crisis since 
2oo8 and the ongoing disarticulation of "globalization" itself. 
What should be considered, more than ideological or geopolitical ri-
valries, is the political-econoinic position States occupy in the world power 
structure. In this context, the first group of contemporary intemational pol-
itics make up the Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis: United States, Canada, 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and, tangentially, Israel. These are 
the hegemonic nations that hold military, diplomatic, financiai, technological, 
intelligence and communications resources. Being in the post-industrial rent-
ier phase, it lives on the resources ofthe other nations, employing the means 
mentioned above. 
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The second is the the developed industrial axi.s ofthe European Union, 
Japan and the Asian Tigers. With an advanced productive industrial capital-
ism and a high standard ofliving, it differs from the first group, because this 
one lacks the traditi.onal power resources, such as the military, and full state 
sovereignty. They were protected during the Cold War, but today the situati.on 
is uncertain and the tensions with the former are increasing. Further develop-
ments will depend on the politi.cal attitude to be adopted by relevant nati.ons of 
the axis, such as Germany and Japan, the defeated ofWorld War 11. 
The third is the emerging unorthodox industrial axis, integrated by the 
great nati.ons of the BRICS, especially China and Russia, as well as Turkey 
and Iran, where the structures of power and parti.cipati.on in the economy are 
relevant. This is defined as semiperi.phery. Like the previous one, its immediate 
and primary objective is to avoid an armed conflict of global dimensions and 
to maintain its economic development. With resources to defend themselves, 
they fail to project power on a planetary scale and depend to some extent on 
the attitude that will be adopted by the second axis. 
Finally, the fourth is the agrari.an, mineral and detnOgraphic peri.pheral 
axis, composed of the middle and small nati.ons of Lati.n America, Africa, 
and geographical Asia (which includes the Middle East). They have abundant 
human, agricultural, or mineral resources (including energy) but do not have 
military capability or diplomatic articulation, tending to act in a fragmented 
way and forming a contested zone for other axes. Brazil and South Africa 
seem to be absorbed by their internai politi.cal agendas and risk becoming 
part of this group. 
The Anglo-Saxon military-rentier axis 
The dominant group of world politics is integrated into the Anglo-Sax-
on military-rentier axi.s: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand. More than a simple "linguisti.c community", it represents 
a continuity of the Mariti.me Empires and its geopoliti.cs. It is the heir to 19th 
century Briti.sh liberal hegemony and its later colonial empire, as well as the 
alliances (and results) of the two World Wars against the middle powers (Ger-
many and Japan) and the anti-socialistfanti-Soviet Cold War. 
These are collectively hegemonic nations, which have military, diplo-
matic, financiai, technological, intelligence and logistical and informational 
communications resources. Having reached the post-industrial renti.er phase 
(in the last quarter of the twentieth century), they depend on the resources of 
other nati.ons, employing the means mentioned above. With the current Sei-
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entific-Technological Revolution underway, particular attention must be paid 
to the last three aspects, which had revolutionized international relations and 
defense systems. 
lhe so-called UKUSA (United Kingdom and United States of Ameri-
ca) agreement, established in the second half of the 1940s between Washing-
ton and London, gave rise in the rg8os to the system known as Echelon, the 
electronic intelligence and information system. lhis system, based in Eng-
land, collects, processes, and shares information among the Five Eye countries: 
The United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. 
Previously focused on military issues against the Warsaw Pact during the Cold 
War, from the rg8os onwards, it included industrial and political espionage, 
including NATO allies in the European Union, as denounced in the European 
Parliament in 2000 (Silva 2018). 
The system does not only encompass the metropolitan territory of 
these countries, but a cluster of small islands and strategic points in ali Oceans 
and continents. One of the points of the Echelon world espionage system, for 
example, is located on the British island of Ascension in the center of the At-
lantic Ocean. These are not only "antennae" of the system, but also military 
bases andfor Tax Heavens, connected to the financiai center ofl..ondon. lhe 
United Kingdom was able to adapt to its hegemonic decline, through an alli-
ance with the United States, with both countries converging on UN Security 
Council votes. 
lhe United States is the leader of the group, with the dollar, diplo-
macy, the military, the cultural industry, and the almost exclusive control of 
the electronic media and lnternational Organizations. But the others are not 
"dominated", but rather are integral and active (though discrete) parts of the 
group. Israel, tangentially, is associated with the group, but has its own re-
gional agenda, maintains some independence and is a nuclear power. There 
are also European appendices from a strategic point ofview such as Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Romania, 
Bulgaria and the Baltic countries (Iithuania, Latvia and Estonia). 
Although they are members ofthe European Union, as well as the UK 
up until Brexit, their focus in the area of Defense has been the convergence 
with the Anglo-Saxon axis. In the Geopolitical South (the Third World), Chile, 
Colombia, Morocco, Kenya and Saudi Arabia (although Riyadh holds some 
autonomy) can be mentioned as partners ofthe axis with agendas of"regional 
allies", projecting influence in their surroundings. But these countries do not 
have the power requirements previously enumerated to be part of the previ-
ous group or the ability to influence decisions and strategies and neither are 
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desired as partners by the Big Five>. 
The developed industrial axis 
The second group is the industriaUy-developed axis of the European 
Union, Japan and the Asian Tigers. With an advanced productive industrial 
capitalism and a high standard ofliving, it differs from the first, because this 
group lacks the traditional power resources (except France), like military and 
full sovereignty. They were protected during the Cold War, but today the situa-
tion is uncertain and tensions with the first axis are increasing. Further devel-
opments will depend on the political attitude to be adopted by relevant nations 
of the axis, such as Germany and Japan, the defeated of World War li, and 
France, which has proved incapable of acting strategically in a coherent way. 
lts composition is based on the previous middle powers that became 
industrialized by late nineteenth century (Central Europe and Japan) and af-
ter World War 11 (the rest ofEurope and the Asian Tigers). During the Cold 
War they were engaged as members of NATO (Europe) or through Bilateral 
Defense Pacts in East Asia. And in the case of the members o f the fascist Axis 
(Berlin, Rome and Tokyo), there are serious institutional and military limita-
tions to full sovereignty. This is due not just because of American troops and 
military bases in its territory (some on behalf of NATO), but also from the 
obstacles to the constitution of their own rnilitary and aerospace technology 
and industry. Also, the fact that these states were rebuilt by occupation forces 
after 1945. which shaped their elites, nowadays divided and lacking strategic 
vision, poses a significant weight. 
The French case is emblematic because, among the countries of this 
axis, it has an unique position: nuclear power status, permanent membership 
at the UN Security Council, with a network of bases around the world and 
an independent aerospace technology and industry. Together with Germany, 
it represents the hard core of the European Union, but since the 1970s it is 
immersed in a strategic identity crisis. For their tum, in Germany and Japan, 
with their significant advanced technologies and economies, elites appear to 
be suffering from a post-Cold War syndrome, failing to define a coherent pro-
ject for its intemational action. The case of Germany's relationship with Rus-
sia and the United States is an example: with economic interests converging 
with Moscow and the defense agenda being linked to Washington. 
2 In allusion to the five African animais capable of self-defense: the lion, the elephant, the 
buffalo, the rhinoceros and the leopard. In this case, these are the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. 
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In East Asia, with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the same is true in 
relation to United States and China. Artificially fostered military crises sus-
tain a permanent state o f insecurity, aiming to limit the convergence between 
the Tigers and the Chinese Dragon. Provocations towards North K.orea, which 
reacts in the expected and desired manner, proved to be just enough to main-
tain alignment with Washington's security plans. However, Trump' s US and 
China trade war goes well beyond a renegotiation dispute among partners, 
since the real economic and technological conflict, which is much more com-
plex and multidimensional is taking place between the US and the EU, in 
particularly Germany. 
In the same logic, it is worth to remember that Samuel Huntington 
(1997, 195) defined that the West's core was located in the North Atlantic, 
and NATO is its linkage organization. So, the EU and JapanfAsian Tigers 
dilemma is that their relations with the USare getting weaker, whereas they 
grow stronger with the BRICS, in particular China and Russia. Nevertheless, 
diplomatic-security ties with Washington, as well as the arrangement between 
the ruling elites of the two shores o f the Pacific, remain strong. 
Color Revolutions arrived in Europe with Brexit, "populist" political 
movements and destabilizing radical violence (such as the French Yellow 
Jackets), as well as an open disrespect for community norms, terrorist attacks, 
separatism and massive induced migrations are part of the same process. 
Clearly, there is a sociological basis for such a phenomenon, with the gradual 
wreck of the Welfare State and the draining out of the universe of traditional 
politics, but there is a synchronization. Steve Bannon is not a "rebel without 
a cause." 
The semi-peripheral industrially-emergent axis 
The third group consists of the emerging industrial axis, composed of 
the great BRICS nations, especially China and Russia, as well as Turkey and 
Iran, in which the state's participation in development is a determining factor. 
Conceptually defined as the semi-periphery, they are clearly targeted by Donald 
Trump's US and his America First doctrine. like the previous axis, its imme-
diate goal is to avoid an armed conflict of global dimensions and to maintain 
its economic development. With resources to defend themselves, they still 
cannot project global military power and depend on the attitudes that the sec-
ond axis will adopt. But some o f them have deterrent power and are becoming 
more assertive as the crisis that began in 2008 and global tensions deepen. 
Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
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cil and, like India, nuclear powers. China maintains its socialist regime with a 
globalized multifaceted development project with high growth rates that have 
already made the country the second largest economy in the world. And this 
productive advance is being accompanied by the increase of its technological 
and defense capabilities. The Chinese State covers 22% ofthe world's popu-
lation and enjoys internai stability and intemational autonomy. Its "socialist 
market" development project is similar to the old Soviet New Political Econo-
my (NEP) ofthe rgzos, but with an intemationalized dimension. Its commer-
cial, financiai and technological connections, both with developed and devel-
oping capitalist countries, have transformed world geo-economy, particularly 
in the peripheral areas. 
In its tum, Russia represents another re-ernerging power, since it is the 
heir of the defeated Soviet superpower after severe weakening and decline in 
the rggos. Technological capacity, the aerospace and armaments industry, as 
well as defense capabilities, make it the only state with ability to strategically 
compete with the United States. However, it suffers from some weakness-
es, once its govemance is still fragile. It does not have a structuring party 
(as in China or in the Soviet Union era) and society underwent major trans-
formations and fragmentation. Moreover, from a geopolitical point of view, 
its surroundings (the "near abroad") and international connections present 
weaknesses, despite the creation ofthe Eurasian Economic Union (which ag-
gravated the Ukrainian problem). 
As for the Indian elephant, economic growth and an increasing inter-
national presence are observed, but with a troubling social backwardness of 
a rapid growing population, which will surpass the Chinese in a few years. 
The Chinese population is stabilized and aging, while the Russian has aged 
and quantitatively receded. However, these two countries have vast territories 
and natural resources, unlike India. Although India's nuclear status had been 
supported by the United States, the country faces serious security challenges, 
both externai (China and Pakistan) and internai (terrorism, separatism and 
Maoist Naxalita guerrilla). 
Brazil and South Africa (post-apartheid) experienced accelerated de-
velopment at the beginning of the 21st century and, alongside India, created 
the IBSA Trilateral Cooperation Forum in 2003. But in recent years both na-
tions have experienced serious crises of governability and economic stagna-
tion, currently lacking a strategic project. In the same way, the two nations 
lost their leadership in the field of regional integration. Brazil, in particular, is 
on the verge of being downgraded to the fourth axis, which will be analyzed 
below. Two states that achieved economic and political-military advances were 
Turkey and lran, acquiring a position and status similar to that ofthe BRICS. 
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But both find themselves in an extremely vulnerable line of geopolitical frac-
ture and present a certain domestic and intemational fragility. 
However, the BRICS, which carne to be characterized as power pole in 
2009 (in response to the unfolding ofthe 2008 crisis), had developed consid-
erable economic and diplomatic mechanisms, although they are nota "bloc", 
but a forum. In addition to integrating IBSA nations, there is another im-
portant organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which 
emerged in 1996 with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
Subsequendy, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan joined this bloc (as well as oth-
er observer states). It has an economic and security focus and articulates an 
Eurasian pole, which represents a strategic nightmare for the US (Brzezinski, 
1998). However, Russia and China are allies, ma non tropo, as both have par-
tially different and competing agendas. 
The great emerging nations constitute some sort of semi-periphery, in 
which the previous accumulation of capital places them in a position of global 
economic projection, generating a situation in which the growing economic 
weight clashes with the existing world political order. Putin' s Russia cannot 
be seen solely as an energy power (gas, oil and uranium), since this sector 
intemationalized companies mean a growing global presence. In addition, 
Moscow became, once more, a major exporter of advanced weapons. In its 
tum, in addition to China' s growing economic presence in Africa and Latin 
America, the country has launched bold Eurasian initiatives such as the N ew 
Silk Road and OBOR (One Belt, One Road). They represent the emergence 
of a pivotalland zone, which brings together the basic elements of classical 
geopolitics, with new economic elements. 
The agrarian, mineral and demographic peripheral axis 
Finally, the fourth axis is the agrarian, mineral and demographic periph-
eral, composed of the medium and sinall nations of Latin America, Africa 
and geographical Asia (which includes the Middle East). They have abundant 
human, agricultural, or mineral resources (including energy) but do not have 
military capability or diplomatic articulation, tending to act in a fragmented 
way and forming a contested zone for the other axes. Brazil and South Africa, 
members ofthe BRICS, seem to be being "downgraded" dueto their internai 
political agendas and disputes, and risk becoming part of this group. 
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Structuml dimensions 
The Geopolitical South (the 1bird World) encampasses Latin Ameri-
ca, Africa, Westem, Central and Southem Asia, in which the growth of world 
population occurs. Not only they represent a significant reserve of young 
manpower and potential consumer market, but also generates an unoccu-
pied population surplus that generate migratory and refugee conflicts crises. 
The United States-Mexico border and the Mediterranean Sea have become 
extremely vulnerable zones to this phenomenon. The are from Pakistan to 
T apan (with the exception of the westem half of China) h ouses more than half 
the world's population. The Middle East and the northem half of Africa are 
experiencing strong destabilization. 
On the other hand, the consumer democracies of the N orth use enor-
mous volumes o f food and raw materiais ( energy and minerais, among others), 
which production and reserves are located in the South (Paiva 2011, 32). 1bis 
phenomenon is further aggravated by the increase in per capita consumption 
in emerging nations and the urban middle classes from al1 the Geopolitical 
South. There are vast spaces for profitable investments (infrastructure, min-
ing, services, agribusiness), within a framework of growing inter-capitalist 
competition, which opposes, mainly, the old industrial powers and the emer-
gent ones of the semi-periphery. Thus, this part of the planet is the stage of 
an economic and strategic dispute that is similar to the one that preceded the 
First World War. 
The Geopolitical South concentrates approximately two thirds of the 
existing States (quite unequal), with an overwhelming majority with great po-
litical-social fragility and military and economic weakness. Their internation-
al agenda consists simply of maintaining their existence as a nation and the 
local elites in power. Many Cold War era coalition initiatives, such as the G-77 
and the Non-Aligned Movement, which sought to formulate a common agen-
da and increase the region's political weight at the UN, lost focus with the end 
ofbipolarity. From the rggos onwards, due to the neoliberal cycle of globali-
zation severa! regional integration initiatives were presented, but they faced 
structural difficulties at local and globallevels. So, although the G DP of many 
of the nations of the South is growing, sometimes above the world average, 
political vulnerability, economic instability and social tension are increasing. 
Despite material differences and foreign policy alignments, these 
states have structurally similar position in the world economy. Directly or in-
directly, they are subject to the agendas formulated bythe North-Atlantic pow-
ers and to the actions of powerful states and transnational mega-companies. 
Nevertheless, in several regions that make up the Geopolitical South some 
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pivot states can be identi.fied, with some political and eventually economic 
relevance. 
Regi.ons and pivot states 
In Latin America, after the "Pink Tide" of center-left govemments with 
advances in the social agenda (without a neoliberal rupture), the trend is the 
reverse (by severa! means) ofmost ofthem. In addition to domestic changes, 
there is the emptying of integration projects, such as Mercosur, and of Latin 
American and South American associations, such as CELAC and UNASUR, 
respectively. Brazil, as analyzed, :finds itself in a political and economic situ-
ation that is leading it to the position of a giant member of this fourth axi.s, 
while Argentina has been in it for quite some time. 
In South America, Chile and Colombia maintain a pro-Washington 
strategic role, the first with its powerful army and bi-oceanic geopolitical po-
sition. Nowadays, the second, with a long-term cooperation with the US in 
counterinsurgency and in the fight against drug trafficking, plays a significant 
role in the Venezuelan crisis. Mex:ico, while still subordinate to the United 
States economy, has a kind of"negative or unwitting activism", since the is-
sues of migration and drug trafficking are taking a center stage. For its tum, 
Trump' s administration biggest interest in the subcontinent is the economic 
agenda and containment of China's growing presence with its investments, 
services, commerce and infrastructure construction. 
Today, much more than the Ibero-American region, Africa represents 
a region in fierce geopolitical dispute between former and emerging powers, 
which includes the strategic spaces of the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. 
Added to this, there is terrorism in its northem ha1f, coups d'état, civil wars 
-as in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan- and the col-
lapse of states - such as the ones in libya and Somalia. Morocco continues 
as a strategic Westem ally, with the pending Westem Sahara issue and its 
carnpaign as a "Trojan Horse" in the South, in favor of the so-called Atlantic 
Community (linking the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic). Already South 
Africa is strategically stagnated by the effects of its post-Apartheid transition 
agreement, no longer being the largest economy in the continent, a position 
now occupied by the populous Nigeria. 
However, the continent has its own dynamics and states that advance 
economically and politically. In the context of the African continent, Angola, 
Nigeria and Ethiopia could be considered sorts of regional powers. Ironically, 
African cooperation agencies have played a growing role in economic cooper-
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ation and conflict resolution. Djibouti, for its part, had become a core center, 
not only because of its geopolitical position at the entrance to the Red Sea, but 
also because it shelters bases of countries such as France, the USA and China. 
Equally, K.enya also is a Westem strategic pivot. lhe Gulf of Guinea, with its 
oil resources, has also turned into a strategic region. lhe clash of the United 
States and France to the growing Chinese presence is the main cleavage ofthe 
continent. Instead of a narrative of victimization, one can see that such a situ-
ation has given African states a leverage of political and economic autonomy 
that they had never experienced in 6o years ofindependence (Visentini 2013). 
lhe Middle East, like Africa, is a region in a fierce strategic dispute 
for its geopolitical position and energy resources, but in a much more direct 
and violent way. Even though this is not unprecedent, nowadays it presents a 
new meaning which is not restricted to regionally restricted conflicts. It be-
came the Great Midd.le East, with the inclusion of new states of the Caucasus 
(Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and former Soviet Union Central Asia 
and Afghanistan, stage ofthe new Great Game or Grand Chessboard. Geor-
gia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and conflicted Afghanistan are a pro-NATO 
corridor separating Russia and its allies from Central Asia also from its other 
allies Iran, Armenia and Syria. 
Turkey has apparently given up its rapprochement with the European 
Union and got closer to Russia and Iran, which is considered a threat by Isra-
el, Saudi Arabia and the GulfPetro-monarchies, except for Qatar and Oman. 
lhe domestic political cleavages ofYemen (blocked by Riyadh and devastated 
by the civil war) were contained by Iran and Saudi Arabia. lhe Saudi King-
dom undergoes an internai struggle within the ruling elite (dozens of factions 
of rival princes) and constitutes a fundamentalist theocracy and absolutist 
monarchy that admitted its association with Israel. The country has a signifi-
cant oil and financiai weight and is a mentor and financier of fundamentalist 
Islamic movements. In addition to the internationalized civil wars of Syria 
and Yemen, lraq remains a battleground, with the Kurdish issue occupying a 
central position. 
However, it would be wrong to think that this is a clash between Sun-
nis and the West against Shiites. At stake is the attempt by conservative mon-
archies and Westem powers to overthrow secular and modemizing regimes, 
which include Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Iran (which is modemizing), and Turkey, 
which has cooled its relationship with NATO and got closer to Russia. lhe for-
mally "counter-terrorist" intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan was a failure 
and the attempt to overthrow the Ba'as regime in Syria, was also unsuccess-
ful, making room for Russia in the region. 
In South Asia, added to India (already analyzed), Pakistan (a nuclear 
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power) has approached China and Iran. lt is worth mentioning the prorni-
nence and relative autonomy o f the Association of Southeast Asian N ations 
(ASEAN) 10 member states. Made of rich (Singapore and Malaysia) and poor 
sates (Philippines), monarchies and republics, large and small, socialist and 
capitalist, stable and unstable and democratic regimes Westem-like (Thai-
land) and considered authoritarian (Myanmar), ASEAN manages to develop a 
common autonomous political agenda. lhe Association represents a balance 
between the giants China and India, despite tensions in the South China Sea. 
On the K.orean península (along with Japan), local tensions are framed by 
global antagonisms. 
lhe huge Pacific Ocean space is under the sea powers control, with 
Australia (called in the region "USA of Pacific") and New Zealand playing 
an important role, controlling numerous archipelagos, as well as the Unit-
ed States, France and UK. The Indian Ocean is, in tum, a disputed space, 
with the last three nations (plus Australia) occupying a dominant position, 
but having to face the growing Chinese and Russian naval presence. On the 
other hand, the strategic spots o f the South Adantic are at is center, in sea cor-
ridors to other Oceans, which are quietly controlled by the United Kingdom. 
Finally, even the Arctic and Antarctic polar spaces became regions where the 
econornic and military presence of the developed capitalist powers rivais with 
the emerging ones. 
Structures, processes and trends 
The end of the Cold War and its bipolar system produced new realities 
and theoretical challenges. Many attempts to interpret it have been sought, 
although it seems clear that the US and the Anglo-Saxon powers that are part 
of the first axis of power remain dominant, but in a framework of accelerated 
mutation and leaning towards multipolarity. Justas Kissinger (1973) very well 
defined in his doctoral thesis regarding the European balance of power, there 
is a Global Balance of Power (unstable) at the beginning of the 2111 century. 
There are two leveis of intemational cleavages, which are not overlapping ex-
actly: one political and the other economic, which may indicate an asynchrony 
between the structure of political power and the one of economic power. 
Political cleavages that affect the distribution of world power oppose 
China and Russia (or the hard core of the BRICS) on one side and the An-
glo-Saxon powers on the other, with the European UnionfJapan group as re-
luctant allies. In its tum, economic cleavages go well beyond the "emerging 
vs. declining" view, as the Trump administration is showing. It is true that 
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Asia had become the great industrial manufacturing center of the world, but 
the international econorny is characterized by a dynarnic that is, at the sarne 
time, of integration and conflict (as of an uneven and cornbined develop-
rnent). As Arrighi (1996) pinpointed, the world systern is characterized by the 
coexistence between territorial states and capital, with transnational mobility. 
Therefore, while on the one hand emerging countries, as national 
states, dernand a share of power cornpatible with their increasing econorn-
ic weight, on the other they are linked to large developed or post-industrial 
nations. In this context, the US-China "Trade War" resernbles the US-Japan 
one ofthe 198os. China has a syrnbiotic relationship with the United States, 
and the current dispute seems to contain elements of renegotiation of the 
econornic "pact" between them. The real target of Arnerican attack is Europe 
centered around Germ.any (its advanced capitalist rival) and the new contain-
rnent of serni-peripheral states of the region that it geopolitically controls (as 
in Brazil' s case). 
It does not rnean, however, that the ArnericanfAnglo-Saxon power 
will maintain its dorninant position. Historian and dernographer Emmanuel 
Todd (2003, 4) argued that 
"there will be no Arnerican empire. The world is too vast, diverse and dy-
namic to accept the dominance of a single power. The examination of the 
demographic and cultural, industrial and monetary, ideological and mili-
tary forces that transform the planet does not confirm the current vision 
of an invulnerable America. ( ... )A realistic picture [shows] a great nation 
whose power was incontestable, but that the relative decline seems irrevers-
ible. The United States was indispensable to the balance of the world; today 
they cannot maintain their standard of living without the world's subsi-
dies. America, by its military theater activism, directed against insignificant 
states, tries to mask its ebb. The fight against terrorism, Iraq and the 'axis 
of evil' are no more than excuses. Because it no longer has the strength 
to control the larger actors that are Europe and Russia, Japan and China, 
America willlose this last match for world domination. She will become a 
great power among others." 
The trends brought up by the postmodern and neoliberal world hit 
the countries differently. The Anglo-Saxon axis has a post-industrial (finance, 
technology, services) economy that is more administrative (budget balancing), 
while the developed axis and the emerging axis are productive (cornmodity 
producers). In the South, the weakening ofthe state, the surplus population 
and insufficient development provoke increasing crime and migration, but 
not of the poorer. 
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In addition, social consequences alter the stru.cture of society. While 
in the North the cities are degraded (Detroit is the most radical case), in the 
South arise chaotic megalopolis, with crime and pollution. Drug use on a 
growing scale, in addition to profitable business, represents a form of social 
control of the youth, which seeks niches and does not engage in politics in 
both the North and the South. Outsourcing and fragmented app jobs, as well 
as the "entrepreneur" of the "creative economy" replace the old syndicated 
working class. 
How does this stage of capitalism affect intemational relations and the 
hierarchy between powers? Immigration transforms the North from within, 
justas it did with the Roman Empire, but differently. In postcolonial states 
(historically recipients of immigrants) there is some assimilation, while in 
Europe there are growing tensions in an aging society with no new political 
projects. In the South, a producer of commodities, the attitude of the elites 
is different, lacking a project and in a hasty economic downturn, with Latin 
America being the worst case. Due to the Technological Revolution and the 
progress of other regions, an irrecoverable gap is being formed. 
In Africa and the post-Arab Spring Middle East, there seems to be a 
reshaping of the ruling elites, with the signaling o f new national projects and 
changes in international alliances. As Todd (2003) shows in his work, the 
Arab and Islamic world is in the process of demographic and political mod-
ernization. In Asia, especially in the eastem portion, nowadays there are more 
committed projects and elites, despite system.ic contradictions. Curiously, lit-
tle is being said about the fact that, for decades, the country with the best eco-
nom.ic performance has been the People's Republic ofChina, a socialist state. 
lhe shaping of a larger interconnected Eurasian space (which links 
the Middle East by land) seems to be the greatest fear of US strategists and 
their allies. As America loses its utility to other nations, for how long will 
"counter-terrorism" be an effective means of action? Nothing seems to lead 
to an update of the United Nations structure, venturesome leaders rise and 
tensions build up, in the void of defined strategies. lherefore, more than ever, 
it is necessary to think over the ongoing changes and their impact in the great 
powers game. 
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ANNEX 
AXES OF WOilD POWEI 
AXES OF WORLD POWER 
!.!ll AXIS I 
• AXIS 2 
~ AXIS 3 
~ AXIS 3 Allies 
!j] AXIS 4 {Axis 1 Allies) 
AXIS 4 
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ABSTRACT 
The ranking of the hierarchy and grouping of World Powers is not based exclusively 
on material indicators such as economics, natural resources, territorial extension, 
population size and military resources. 1t is necessary to consider the stage in which 
the transformati.onal process of the post-Cold War Intemational System is, the 
position in which a power stands, and general and specific historical trends. The 
present artide proposes a dassification that identifies the existence of four axes of 
world power: r) the Anglo-Saxon military-rentier; 2) the semi-sovereign industrially-
developed; 3) the semi-peripheral industrially-emergent; and 4) the agrarian, mineral 
and demographic peripheral. 
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